A Zelikow 9/11 Commission narrative brainstorming session
In addition to the Cheney-Bush Administration‘s use of false confessions to help sell the Iraq War, we must now add that these same “enhanced interrogation techniques” (originally developed by the Chicoms during the Korean War for propaganda purposes) were crucial in the writing of the 9/11 Commission Report as well.
We begin with Philip Shenon‘s afterword to his blockbuster account of the methodological deficiencies of the 9/11 Commission, The Commission: What We Didn’t Know About 9/11. He writes:
It was a disclosure that would give members of the 9/11 Commission a justifiable chill in 2008.
The disclosure being then CIA Director Michael Hayden‘s belated confession on 2/5/2008 that the CIA had indeed waterboarded–tortured–three al-Qaeda detainees in 2002, given additional light this week from the radioactive content of the just released OLC legal memos. Shenon wonders:
Was it possible that the commission had missed– or perhaps chosen to ignore–obvious clues in 2003 and 2004 that al-Qaeda detainees were being tortured for information that the commission planned to incorporate throughout its landmark report? Worse, was it possible that some detainees had been tortured, or at least threatened with torture, specifically because of the 9/11 commission?
The clues are contained in the Report’s 1700 footnotes, which according to a detailed analysis by NBC investigative producer Robert <strike> Winderm</strike>Windrem, cited by Shenon, shows that over a quarter of them:
…referred to to CIA interrogation reports from questioning of al-Qaeda operatives who had been subjected to the CIA’s “enhanced” interrogation program, including the trio who had been waterboarded.
How important are the footnotes to the central thesis of the Report that UBL authorized the attacks of 9/11? Well, given that no hard evidence other than tortured confessions of three Qaedas was ever provided to the Commission, I’d say pretty damned important.
David Ray Griffin, in his book 9/11 Contradictions (2008), points out that SecState Colin Powell had promised on Meet The Press (9/23/01) a “paper” documenting proof of UBL’s involvement would be issued “soon.” Never happened. Seymor Hersch reported a few days later that the Justice Department said a white paper was not forthcoming because of a lack of hard facts. Hersch quotes a JD official:
There was not enough to make a sale.
And a CIA official told him:
One day, we’ll know, but at the moment, we don’t know.
Well. we still don’t know. And in what must be considered a quaint understatement now, Shenon observes:
I am not alone in believing the administration’s disclosure about CIA “enhanced interrogation program”– the official euphemism for the harsh methods used to question al-Qaeda detainees after 9/11, including the mock-drowning technique known as waterboarding–cast new doubt on the credibility of important parts of the 9/11 Commission report…
Shenon points out that the Commission wanted to interview al-Qaeda detainees directly, but were rebuffed by the CIA and the Bush Administration. Instead, they had to settle for written answers to their questions, helpfully provided by the same CIA officials who presumably did the torturing.
Is it difficult to imagine that some of these prisoners, especially the three who had been waterboarded, might have been so desperate to end their torment that they embellished–or lied outright–about the September 11 plot to give their American interrogators what they thought the Americans wanted to hear? Wasn’t it possible that the detainees might have misrepresented–oh, say–Osama bin Laden’s role in the 9/11 plot because they knew the Americans would be grateful for any juicy nugget of information about the al-Qaeda leader?
Griffin also points out that the FBI’s two Top 10 most wanted lists (Fugitives, Terrorists) lists UBL, but not for anything to do with 9/11. He cites Muckrakers Report editor Ed Haas‘ report that the FBI’s chief of investigative publicity, Rex Tomb, explained why:
He has not been formally indicted and charged in connection with 9/11 because the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden with 9/11.
Tomb later confirmed his statement to INN World Report editor Claire Brown.
Shenon again:
In the final report, much of the narrative about the 9/11 plot, paragraph after paragraph, page after page, comes largely–and in some cases, exclusively–from the interrogation reports that document what Mohammed, Zubayah, and to a lesser extent, Nashiri apparently told their CIA interrogators.
(Nashir was the alleged ringleader of the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.)
According to Shenon, before the executive director of the 9/11 Commission was appointed, he insisted on hiring the entire staff, requiring that all their reports go through him. He got his wish. Welcoming the new staff to the fold, he announced portentously:
You are now part of a history-writing and history-making enterprise.
For the last 48 hours said director has been falling all over himself drawing attention to a memo he claims to have written criticizing “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Not mentioning, as far as I know, that the false confessions obtained therefrom played a crucial role in the narrative of the 9/11 Commission Report over which he presided.
Philip Zelikow, to the white telephone, please.
[Photo credit here]
